



 Cumulative Strain Theory and Public Mass Murderers from 1990 to 2014 
Abstract 
Scholars have urged a shift in research on mass murder from the creation of typologies to 
theoretically-rich, data-driven comparative examinations of the phenomenon. We seek to redress 
such calls in two ways.  First, we analyze a unique sample of public mass murderers through the 
multi-stage explanatory model of cumulative strain theory. Second, we use a comparison group 
of similarly violent offenders – lone actor terrorists – to provide context to our findings. The 
results demonstrate that cumulative strain theory usefully describes the trajectory toward 
violence of public mass murderers, more so when a concept implicit in the theory – grievance – 
is made explicit. 
 
Introduction 
For almost two decades, scholars have urged a shift in mass murder research from the 
creation of typologies to more rigorous, data-driven examinations of the phenomenon. 
Specifically, several have recommended that research assess offenders within broader theoretical 
perspectives and employ comparison groups (DeLisi & Scherer, 2006; Dowden, 2005; Fox & 
Levin, 1998; Vaughn, DeLisi, Beaver, & Howard, 2009).  Pointedly, Dowden’s (2005) review of 
the state of research on multiple murder examined 139 studies and found that among the least 
frequent analytic approaches was the explanation or development of theory.  Our study seeks to 
redress such concerns in two ways.  First, we analyze our unique and large sample (N = 115) of 
public mass murderers through the lens of the “cumulative strain theory” (CST) proposed by 
Levin and Madfis (2009) in their examination of mass shootings at schools.  As there are no 
theoretical or pragmatic reasons to limit application of the model to school shootings, we 
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propose a more quantitative approach and ask whether a theory which seems to explain the path 
toward mass shootings by students is equally useful when applied to a larger and more diverse 
population of offenders. Second, we employ a comparison group of similarly violent individuals 
– lone actor terrorists.  While their motivations differ (public mass murderers are personally 
motivated, whereas lone actor terrorists are primarily motivated by political, religious, or other 
ideological factors), both aim to commit violence in shared spaces and frequently use, or plan to 
use, similar weapons.  Employing a comparison group of similar attackers in an examination of 
developmental experiences and antecedent behaviors brought into relief important distinctions 
that allowed us to more carefully delineate the trajectory toward violence of public mass 
murderers.   
Literature Review 
 A substantial body of research on mass murderers has relied on either a single case study 
or a small number of case studies (Declercq & Audenaert, 2011; Dietz, 1986; Evseef & 
Wisniewski, 1972; Gallemore & Panton, 1976; Hempel, Meloy, & Richards, 1999; Meloy, 1997; 
Mullen, 2004; Rappaport, 1988).  As a result, statistical comparisons between public mass 
murderers and comparison groups of like offenders has been limited (Delisi & Scherer, 2006) 
and researchers have generally not had data suitable for exploring lifecycle explanations of the 
phenomena (Fox & Levin, 1998).  Existing studies have instead typically generated typologies of 
mass murder based on factors such as motivations and targets (Dietz 1986; Holmes & Holmes, 
1994; Mullen, 2004).  Even studies of mass murders and the related phenomena of “active 
shooters” and “mass shooters” (which focus on shootings, and not fatalities per se) that have 
employed larger samples and/or comparison groups remain largely descriptive (Hempel at al., 
1999; Duwe, 2000, 2004, Meloy et al., 2004; Gill, Silver, Horgan, & Corner, 2016; Lankford, 
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2012, 2015a; Krause & Richardson, 2015).  As with the case studies, these more quantitatively-
oriented studies have led to the development of typologies (Palermo, 1999; Petee, Padget, & 
York, 1997; Fox & Levin, 2003).  
 Recently, scholars have begun considering mass murder through criminological theories 
(Lankford, 2015b; Kennedy-Kollar & Charles, 2013; DeLisi & Scherer, 2006; Piquero, 
Farrington, & Blumstein, 2003; Vaughn, DeLisi, Beaver & Howard, 2009).  Of note is research 
that considers the potential role of Agnew’s general strain theory (GST) in explaining mass 
murder (Fox and Levin, 2012; Fridel, 2017).  Researchers have also sporadically made use of 
terrorists as comparison groups for public mass murderers (Horgan, Gill, Bouhana, Silver, & 
Corner, 2016; Lankford, 2012; Pyrooz, LaFree, & Decker, 2017).  In a similar vein, researchers 
have begun to explore the inherent criminality of terrorism (Agnew, 2010; Chermak & 
Gruenewald, 2015; Clarke & Newman, 2006; LaFree & Dugan, 2004). 
 
Cumulative Strain Theory 
 In 2009, Levin and Madfis proposed a five-stage “cumulative strain” model to explain a 
student’s engagement in a mass shooting at school. Its components comprised chronic strain, 
uncontrolled strain, acute strain, the planning stage, and the event itself.  The term “cumulative” 
is significant, as it underscores the belief that no single stage is sufficient to cause mass violence 
and that it may be more useful to attend to complex interactions of both distal and proximal 
factors in an offender’s life.  Although the model is predicated generally on a sequential 
advancement through the five stages, Levin and Madfis do not claim that all school mass 
shooters progress through all stages of the sequence, or that the sequence itself is static.  
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  The first stage, chronic strain, is based on both Merton’s (1938) framing of Durkheim’s 
anomie theory to include structural barriers that cause some persons to be unable to achieve 
certain expected life objectives, as well as Agnew’s (1992) broadening of the concept to include 
a wider range of negative outcomes in social, school, and work environments.  As strain persists, 
it becomes chronic, potentially leading to a range of consequences including depression and 
anger, which in turn may lead to norm violations including crime.   
The second stage, uncontrolled strain, reflects Hirschi’s (1969) theory of social control, 
which contends that the bonds connecting an individual to social relationships (e.g., family and 
friends) and social institutions (e.g., school and work) discourage the individual from engaging 
in criminal behavior.  Those who experience chronic strain and lack adequate connections to 
other persons and institutions are less likely to be able to abstain from anti-social behaviors, as 
their feelings of strain (and associated anger) will not be mediated by positive interactions.     
 The third stage, acute strain, is the result of a short-term injury or insult that the 
individual experiences as being particularly disastrous, and which critically impairs the ability to 
control feelings of despair and anger.  While incidents causing acute strain can be of the same 
type as chronic strain (e.g., relating to work or romantic relationships), the acute strain is 
experienced as more catastrophic, likely because it comes after a series of failures have already 
subverted the individual’s resiliency.  While chronic strains are more akin to precipitating 
circumstances, acute strains are more akin to the catalyst that immediately precede violent 
action.   
 Following multiple instances of chronic, uncontrolled, and acute strains comes the 
planning stage.  Research has consistently shown that most mass murders are the result of 
considered and thoughtful action (Fox & Levin, 1994; Newman et al., 2004; Vossekuil, Fein, 
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Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2004) and that only a small portion of mass murderers are 
psychotic at the time of their attack (Holmes & Holmes, 2001).  Committing mass murder is 
unlikely to be simple, and a certain amount of preparation is usually necessary, from locating a 
site with targets of interest and/or a suitable number of victims, to obtaining necessary weaponry 
and anticipating and avoiding security measures (Levin & Madfis, 2009; Madfis & Levin, 2013).     
 The final stage is the event itself.  Levin and Madfis conceptualize this stage through the 
routine activities theory of Cohen and Felson (1979), which posits that crime occurs where 
suitable targets are available, effective guardians are absent, and motivated offenders are present.  
Levin and Madfis find the routine activities perspective is useful in explaining a range of school 
shooting offense characteristics, from choice of victims and location, to more practical 
considerations such as the choice of weapon and time of day for the assault. 
 Importantly for the present study, CST is not inherently limited to murderous attacks at 
educational institutions by students, although that is where it has previously been used (Bonanno 
& Levenson, 2014).  The criminological theories from which the model is derived – strain 
theory, social control, and routine activities – are commonly applied to a range of adult offenders 
engaged in diverse criminal behaviors.  Moreover, Levin and Madfis describe CST in relation to 
various forms of adult mass murder.  For example, they note that workplace mass murderers and 
family annihilators generally suffer from chronic strains, and that these same adults are marked 
by uncontrolled strain as they “are almost always socially isolated and lacking in both 
conventional and deviant social bonds” (p. 1233).  In sum, neither the theories embedded in the 









Sample and Data Collection 
A recurring challenge in prior research on mass murder is the perennially-shifting 
definition of what constitutes a mass murder. Some criteria include offender motive (Hempel et 
al., 1999; Rappaport, 1998), type of weapon used (Hempel et al., 1999) and number of wounded 
(Dietz, 1986). However, such criteria are generally not consistently applied in the literature.  
Despite this, there remains widespread agreement that a mass murder involves multiple victims 
killed at one (or multiple but geographically close) location(s) over a relatively short period of 
time (Dietz 1986; Holmes & Holmes, 1992; Hempel et al., 1999; Fox & Levin, 1998, 2003; 
Krouse & Richardson, 2015), although the intentionally imprecise temporal and geographic 
parameters may lead in some cases to overlap with other classifications, particularly spree 
murders (Krouse & Richardson, 2015).  There is less agreement about the minimum number of 
victims required to define a murder event as “mass”.  Some researchers use a threshold of two 
victims (Palermo & Ross, 1999), others use three (Dietz, 1986; Holmes & Holmes, 1992, 1994, 
2001; Petee et al., 1997), and still others use four victims (Duwe, 2000; Fox & Levin, 1998, 
2003, Krouse & Richardson, 2015).   
For the following reasons, we use the threshold of four or more victims (not including the 
offender). First, while the distinction between two or three victims on the one hand and four or 
more victims on the other hand is somewhat arbitrary, the higher threshold serves a practical 
purpose – separating multiple killings from homicide generally (Fox & Levin, 1998).  Recent 
neurocognitive research found support for considering mass murderers as a separate 
criminological subtype from single victim murderers (Fox, Brook, Stratton, & Hanlon, 2016).  
As the definition of mass murder edges closer to the modal single victim murder, the distinction 
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between the two blurs.  Second, in its 2005 report: Serial Murder: Multi-Disciplinary 
Perspectives for Investigators, the FBI used four or more victims (not including the offender) as 
the demarcation line for mass murder.  Although not created by law, that definition resulted from 
considered reflection by leading academics (criminologists, psychologists, forensic 
psychiatrists), and practitioners (state and federal law enforcement officials and prosecutors) 
brought together by the FBI to clarify issues related to multiple murders.  This threshold was also 
recently used by the Congressional Research Service researchers (Krouse & Richardson, 2015) 
in a study of mass murders with firearms. Third, in mass murder studies (such as the present one) 
that rely on open source research methods, the number of victims is an important determinant of 
media coverage (Duwe, 2000, 2004) and we focused on those events most likely to yield usable 
data.     
  For purposes of comparison with our sample of lone actor terrorists (who operate in the 
public domain), we narrowed our parameters to mass murders occurring largely in public places 
and not involving exclusively family members.  Thus, we excluded events that involved only or 
primarily intimate partner violence occurring in the home, as well as the broader category of 
familicides occurring in the home.  There are also theoretical grounds for separately considering 
public mass murders.  Broadly, “domestic/familicide” mass murders are often treated in the 
literature as conceptually distinct from mass murders of non-family members and/or mass 
murders in public places (Holmes & Holmes, 1992; Petee et al., 1997).  The FBI’s Crime 
Classification Manual distinguishes familicide from other mass murders (Douglas et al., 2006).  
In addition, although familicides are perhaps 40% of all mass murders (Fox & Levin, 2003; 
Krouse & Richardson, 2015), the cases that generate the most media attention take place in 
public settings and involve at least some victims who are not related to the offender (Duwe, 
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2004).  Given the sometimes-fluid nature of these events, we used our judgment regarding the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria in a handful of cases, which is not unusual; Krouse and Richardson 
(2015) acknowledge including among their 66 mass public shootings four incidents whose 
circumstances suggested that they could also be considered familicides.   
 We excluded mass murders that appeared to result from underlying crimes (typically 
felonies such a robberies, drug dealing, etc.), as well as gang and/or organized crime activities, 
since practitioners generally consider the motivations of these offenders distinct from those of 
the individuals discussed in the present study (Madfis, 2014).  In addition, research on media 
coverage has also shown that felony-related mass murders are among the least newsworthy mass 
murders (Duwe, 2000).  Finally, we excluded the minority of mass murders with more than one 
offender (Krouse & Richardson, 2015).  Inclusion of multiple-offender events would necessitate 
consideration of group dynamics in decision-making.  Research demonstrates that lone- and 
group-offenders differ in a number of important ways related to strain among both terrorists 
(Gruenewald et al., 2014; Corner & Gill, 2015; Gill, 2015) and criminals (Hauffe & Porter, 2009; 
da Silva, Woodhams, & Harkins, 2014).  Limiting our sample to single-offender events also 
facilitated comparison to the lone actor terrorists who, by definition, commit attacks 
unaccompanied by others (Schuurman et al., 2018).  
 We collected data using open source research methods.  Similar studies regarding 
attempted assassinations of public officials, fatal school shootings, active shooter events, 
terrorism, and violence affecting institutions of higher learning have relied on open source 
research (Drysdale, Modzeleski, & Simons, 2010; Fein & Vossekuil, 1999; Gill, Horgan, & 
Deckert, 2014; Langman, 2009, Lankford,  2012;  Newman, Fox, Roth, Mehta, & Harding, 2004; 
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Vossekuil et al., 2004). We limited our sample to post-1990 events as most of our data was 
collected using the LexisNexis archive, which is much less robust before 1990.  
 To identify our sample, we first examined the academic literature on mass murderers, 
producing a list of names that fit our criteria.  We located additional offenders through databases 
commonly used in mass shooting research (Mother Jones, USA Today, and Mayors Against 
Illegal Guns).  Given the open-source research method, we also conducted tailored searches 
using specific terms (e.g., “mass murder,” “mass shooting,” “public shooting”) on LexisNexis, 
Google, and Google-scholar.  We searched the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) to 
confirm the incidents we had already collected (to the extent possible, given the known 
weaknesses in SHR data collection) and to identify offenders who may not have been captured 
by other sources.  Finally, we confirmed the validity of each offender on our list through the 
process of collecting open-source data, which was available for each offender on our list.  
Ultimately, 115 offenders met the specified inclusion/exclusion criteria.  While there is no way 
to know if we found every mass murderer who fit our parameters, we are confident that we found 
the overwhelming majority as our dataset is very much in line with recent comparable research.  
Using definitions like ours and gathering data primarily from the SHR, Krouse and Richardson 
(2015) identified 66 mass public shootings (with four or more killed) over a 15-year period 
(1999-2013; 4.4 events per year).  During that same 15-year period, we found 88 public mass 
murders (1999-2013; 5.9 events per year), and over the longer 25-year period of our study, we 
found 115 public mass murders (1990-2014; 4.6 events per year) (although nine mass murderers 
in our overall sample used a weapon other than a firearm).   
 We collected data from open source news reports, sworn affidavits, and, where possible, 
court records.  Most sources came from tailored LexisNexis searches.  We also located data in 
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online public record depositories such as documentcloud.org, biographies of mass murderers, 
and relevant scholarly articles.  We modeled our codebook on the codebook used for data 
collection with our comparison group of lone actor terrorists.  The codebook contains more than 
180 variables (many with sub-parts) covering four major areas of theoretical interest: 
demographics, antecedent event behaviors, event specific behaviors, and, if the offender survived 
the event, post-event behaviors.  
 Three trained coders independently coded each observation, after which we reconciled 
the results in two ways.  First, we reconciled each coder’s work with that of the other two coders.  
In cases of disagreement on a specific variable, the first author, who reviewed all coding for each 
offender, determined the appropriate response.  As part of this second-stage reconciliation, the 
first author took into consideration the trustworthiness of the sources relied upon by the coders 
(e.g., records of court proceedings were viewed as more reliable than media reports immediately 
after the event), as well as the specific information contained in the source (e.g., official 
statements from law enforcement officials versus comments made by those merely acquainted 
with the offender).  The result was a single set of reconciled data for each offender. 
We obtained data for the comparison group from a previous study of lone actor terrorists 
by Gill et al. (2014), which used a substantially identical data gathering methodology as the 
present study.  For that study, terrorism was defined as the use or threat of action where the use 
or threat is designed to influence the government of to intimidate the public and/or the use or 
threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause.  The 
sample comprised 119 individuals who engaged in or planned to engage in terrorism within the 
U.S. and Europe and were convicted for their actions or died during the commission of their 
offense.  We culled from that dataset only U.S. subjects, yielding a sample of 71 lone actor 
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terrorists who represented a wide range of ideological orientations (32.4% right-wing; 29.6% 
single issue (e.g., abortion); 29.6% religious; the remaining 8.4% nationalist, left-wing, other, or 
unknown).  
While a lone actor terrorist attack in which four or more people are killed could also be 
considered a public mass murder, for purposes of this study we considered the categories as 
distinct and assigned each offender to one group or the other based on whether the offender’s 
motivation was personal/idiosyncratic (e.g., directed at a former employer, stemming from a 
dispute) or terrorism (e.g., aimed at furthering a political, ideological, or religious agenda).  In 
general, we encountered few problems in this process, but the aptness of using lone actor 
terrorists as a comparison sample is underscored by the difficulty in using this binary 
classification in a handful of cases such as Jim David Adkisson and Elliot Rodger.  
In 2008, Adkisson killed two people and wounded seven at a church in Tennessee that his 
ex-wife had attended.  Police found a four-page suicide note/claim of responsibility in his car (he 
survived the event).  While he wrote of his financial challenges (and later admitted that his 
unemployment led to depression and anger), the note is replete with political justifications in 
which he essentially blames his problems on the wider political processes, calls the Democratic 
party an ally of terrorists, labels liberalism as the major problem facing the country, and 
describes the church he targeted as a cult, filled with un-American “vipers” that embraces 
perverts.  In his own words, he characterized his actions as a “hate crime,” “political protest,” 
and a “symbolic killing” in which he was doing “something good for the country” by killing 
“Democrats.”  Contrast that with Rodger, who in 2014 killed six in the California college town 
of Isla Vista.  His lengthy testimonial (mailed just prior to his attack) has some language 
consistent with a political manifesto (e.g., his animosity toward inter-racial couples).  
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Nevertheless, the bulk of this testimonial and his separate YouTube video discuss his lonely 
suffering, his growing rage at the women and girls who gave their affection to others, and his 
desire to punish those who found the romantic and sexual success to which he could only aspire.   
Although both men justified killing after experiencing a range of interrelated personal, 
financial, and social setbacks, the genesis of Rodger’s public violence was his acute personal 
misery, in contrast to Adkisson’s use of public violence as a denunciation of the wider culture 
and as the means to make a political statement.  We place Rodger in the public mass murder 
sample.  Even had Adkisson killed four people, we would have placed him in the lone actor 
terrorist sample.  So, while the line between public mass murders and lone actor terrorist events 
is not always clear, our decisions were based on a thoughtful review of the available evidence.    
 
Analysis 
 We compared the samples of public mass murderers and lone actor terrorists through the 
five sequential stages of CST.  It is important here to note a limitation characteristic of open 
source methodology, which is that media reports typically do not address all the myriad 
biographical details relevant to researchers. Although we selected variables presumably of 
interest to the public and of the type we could reasonably expect the media to cover, no sources 
exhaustively listed experiences the offender did not have (e.g., the offender was never 
unemployed), or behaviors the offender did not engage in (e.g., the offender did not make dry 
runs prior to the event).  We treat each variable dichotomously (the answer is either “yes” or “not 






We were conservative in assessing what constitutes “strain.”  Presumably, all people 
regularly confront obstacles to happiness and success, and most possess adequate resources and 
coping skills to navigate these challenges without causing harmful stress to themselves.  We took 
as evidence of strain only conditions that would likely have had an adverse impact on the 
individual and which are commonly recognized as being difficult (e.g., being unemployed, 
facing eviction), or were contemporaneously noted by the offender as causing significant distress 
(e.g., in conversation with family or friends) and/or by those around the offender (e.g., work 
files, court records).  For all comparisons between the public mass murderer and the lone actor 
terrorist samples, we used 2 x 2 chi-squared analysis or Fisher’s exact test where appropriate. 
 
Data 
Chronic strain (frustrations occurring up to six months before the event) 
The data show that the public mass murderers, who were overwhelmingly male (97%), 
struggled to accomplish commonly identified positive goals and experienced circumstances and 
exhibited behaviors inimical to the achievement of lasting social, financial and emotional 
stability.  For some, struggles may have been related to having been born outside the U.S. (19%); 
barriers traditionally faced by immigrants (e.g., language skills, difficulty documenting 
employment history) may have affected the ability of these offenders to thrive across a range of 
expectations.   For nearly a third, their highest level of education was high school, and only 10% 
graduated from college. This lack of success in education is seemingly reflected in their 
employment circumstances, with 13% unemployed, 30% working in the service industry, and 
only 5% holding a professional position.  In the years leading up to the event, 20% were under 
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significant employment stress (e.g., poor performance reviews, potential job loss), and 15% had 
financial problems beyond those generally resulting from their socio-economic status.  
 Aside from failing to advance much in two areas generally considered cornerstones of 
success in the United States – education and employment – many offenders struggled with 
mental illness.  To capture all potentially relevant information we applied a definition of mental 
illness that was intentionally broad – even childhood and adolescent manifestations of certain 
disorders, such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, were included as mental illness.  In 
addition, we accepted as evidence of mental illness as wide a range of reasonably reliable facts 
and statements as was possible.  Nearly half had at least one indicator of mental illness (47%).  
Evidence of mental illness was most commonly a diagnosis by a medical professional (26%), 
followed by evidence of either the possession of psychiatric medications, participation in 
counseling, or both (20%) and self or family reports (17%) (some offenders had multiple 
indicators of mental illness). We did not consider all reports of mental illness sufficiently reliable 
to conclude that the offender had mental illness.  In 6% of cases we took as evidence of mental 
illness suicide attempts or suicidal ideation prior to the event, particularly where other 
indications supported the conclusion that the offender was mentally ill.  Many offenders also had 
a history of substance abuse (44%).  Mental illness and substance abuse co-occurred in 18 
offenders, with 76% of the sample experiencing one of these issues.  They were also 
significantly involved with the criminal justice system, with over half having been arrested, over 
40% having been convicted, and over a quarter having been incarcerated.   
The sample also experienced a significant amount of non-trivial negative personal 
interactions that can reasonably be viewed as likely to cause long-term strain.  Over a third had a 
significant problem in a meaningful personal relationship, 11% felt that someone important to 
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them did not care about them, nearly a quarter felt that they had been degraded in a social setting, 
a quarter felt that they had been the target of an injustice, and 19% believed that they had been 
disrespected.  These interactions may in part explain the degree of offenders (31%) displaying 
contextually inappropriate amounts of anger.  Overall, 63% of the sample suffered from long-
term stress that had a negative effect on their lives.  Results of the comparison between the 
public mass murderers and the lone actor terrorists are shown in Table 1.  While some 
similarities are apparent, public mass murderers were significantly more likely to experience 
chronic strain. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Uncontrolled strain (the absence of prosocial relationships in the five years before the event) 
A little more than a quarter (26%) of public mass murderers were described by others 
who knew them well (e.g., family, co-workers, neighbors) as being socially isolated, and most 
offenders lived with at least one other person (24% lived alone at the time of the event).  Twenty 
nine percent were in a relationship at the time of the event (16% partnered, 13% married).  Of 
course, it is possible to be in a relationship which does not have a pro-social effect; nevertheless, 
the relationship variable indicates that a substantial portion of public mass murderers were at a 
minimum able to establish a substantive connection with others.  Table 2 shows the result of the 
comparison with lone actor terrorists on variables measuring uncontrolled strain.  The samples 
had similar proportions of relationship statuses, but in general, public mass murderers showed 
less evidence of uncontrolled strain than lone actor terrorists. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Acute strain (frustrations occurring in the six months prior to the event) 
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In the six months preceding their attacks, public mass murderers faced a variety of non-
trivial negative life circumstances that could be perceived as disastrous to an individual whose 
personal resources had already been compromised by previous failures and/or who has faced 
persistent stressors.  Over half the public mass murderers became unemployed (29%) or 
encountered serious stressors at their place of employment (24%).  Nearly a fifth had difficulty 
meeting their financial obligations and 13% changed address in the six months before the event 
(a commonly stressful enterprise that might signal the end or diminishment of important social 
connections).  They also met challenges in other areas, with a quarter finding problems in 
meaningful personal relationships, and between 10% and 17% feeling that they had been 
degraded, been the target of unjust treatment, been disrespected, or had someone important to 
them indicate that they did not care for the offender.  In addition, more than a third were 
inappropriately angry or experienced an elevated level of stress.  Table 3 shows that public mass 
murderers generally experienced more acute strains than lone actor terrorists. 
 
[Table 3 about here]                      
Planning stage (preparation and planning for the event) 
It is noteworthy that 15% of public mass murders appeared to be spontaneous incidents 
arising from physical or emotional conflicts immediately prior to the attack, and in which the 
offender exhibited no meaningful planning behaviors.  In the remaining 85% of cases, public 
mass murderers engaged in relatively few planning and preparation activities.  Fifteen percent 
tried to recruit at least one person for their attack, 15% planned a getaway, 14% made plans for 
further attacks, 8% made some noticeable pre-attack change to their appearance, and 7% had 
assistance in procuring weapons.  They showed little interest in research with less than 10% 
reading materials about or by other mass casualty attackers or violent movements.  Very few 
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public mass murderers met with other potential offenders either face-to-face (7%) or virtually 
(3%) or joined wider violent movements (6%).  Similarly, very few engaged in dry runs of their 
attacks (4%), partook in any attack-related training (8%), or traveled as a precursor to the event 
(2%).  Notably, 20% of the sample took drugs or alcohol just before the event, possibly blunting 
the effect of any planning (although the use of these substances might have been intentional 
effort to reduce anxiety or fear associated with the event).  As shown in Table 4, public mass 
murderers were significantly less likely than lone actor terrorists to perform nearly all planning 
related behaviors and were significantly more likely to engage in the one behavior (drug or 
alcohol use just prior) that would potentially diminish the benefits of planning. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Event stage (location/targets/weapons) 
Most (79%) public mass murderers had a history with their attack location (e.g., had 
worked or lived there).  Nearly all (91%) targeted only people (as opposed to property), with 9% 
targeting both.  Most offenders also (79%) had at least one discriminate target (i.e., a person or 
group of persons identified prior to the event) among their victims, although in some cases the 
offender did not kill the intended target, and in many cases the offender also killed persons who 
did not seem to be targets prior to the event. Over a quarter of the attacks involved multiple but 
geographically close sites.  Very few public mass murderers (2%) employed an explosive device, 
with most (93%) using a firearm (the remaining weapons included cutting instruments and 
arson).  More than half (56%) of these offenders died at or near the scene of the attack, either by 
suicide or at the hand of law enforcement.  Table 5 show that events of public mass murderers 
and lone actor terrorists differ significantly across a variety of variables.  




The data broadly support the principal contention of CST – the trajectory toward public 
mass murder is built on repeated frustrations over time for individuals who also experience what 
they perceive to be catastrophic acute strains prior to an attack.  We found considerable evidence 
of both chronic and acute strain for public mass murderers who appear to experience both at 
absolutely high levels and relatively high levels in comparison to lone actor terrorists.  Our 
findings are consistent with a recent research into differences in general and acute strains 
suffered by non-extremist and extremist mass public shooters (Capellan & Anisin, 2018).  
Nevertheless, the results do not uniformly validate CST as we found less robust confirmation for 
the other hypothesized stages.   
Support for uncontrolled strain is mixed.  While some public mass murderers seemed to 
lack conventional and pro-social relationships, most established at least one substantive 
connection with another person, as demonstrated by the proportion of the sample in 
relationships.  Of course, not all relationships have pro-social effects, but comparison with lone 
actor terrorists at least, public mass murderers experienced less uncontrolled strain.  
The data provide little validation of the planning stage.  In part, this may be explained by 
the 15% of public mass murders that appeared to be spontaneous.  Nevertheless, while mass 
violence is, as Levin and Madfis (2009:1237) note, “not a simple criminal act to perpetrate,” 
there is scant evidence that offenders spent meaningful time or effort on operational 
considerations (e.g., research, reconnaissance, escape) that might be expected to typify the 
planning stage of an attack.  By contrast, lone actor terrorists were far more likely to engage in 
almost all behaviors indicative of carefully designed attacks.   
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Finally, the routine activities approach that CST posits as shaping the event itself does 
not account for the predominate characteristics of public mass murder attacks.  Public mass 
murderers were much more likely than lone actor terrorists to target persons identifiable before 
the event and attack at locations with which the offenders had a history, suggesting that public 
mass murders had less to do with the “opportunity analysis” of routine activities theory and more 
to do with historical personal interactions.  This may be because routine activities theory is 
essentially a macro-level theory, useful in explaining crime by assessing criminal opportunities 
across communities and sub-units of those communities (Cohen & Felson, 1979; McNeely, 
2015).  While our findings are not inimical to routine activities theory (i.e., negative interactions 
are likely often related to routine daily activities), they do suggest that public mass murders are 
the result of something beyond the calculus involving available targets and a lack of guardians to 
protect these potential victims.  
 In general, our findings suggest that social control theory and routine activities theory do 
not meaningfully augment the fundamental approach of Levin and Madfis and from which their 
theory takes its name – cumulative strain.  At least with respect to public mass murderers, we 
think it is more useful to consider CST as an elaboration of Agnew’s GST.  We see three primary 
ways in which GST essentially accounts for the full range of concepts that Levin and Madfis 
include in their sequential model.  Happily, this approach avoids one of the more contentious and 
still unsettled issues in the history in criminology – the wisdom of integrating theories (Krohn & 
Ward, 2016).  
 First, as conceived in GST, the effects of strains were likely to be cumulative after some 
undetermined threshold is reached (Agnew, 1992).  So, the main contention of Levin and 
Madfis’ CST – that chronic and acute strains have an accumulative impact over time – fits 
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comfortably within GST.  Indeed, a major strength of CST is its expansive search for strains 
throughout the lifetime of the offender, and we believe that adopting this approach has enabled 
us to describe more fully than prior studies the experiences and antecedent behaviors of public 
mass murderers. 
Second, GST has a place for pro-social relationships (or lack thereof) that Levin and 
Madfis posited in their stage of “uncontrolled strain.”  GST anticipates several constraints to 
nondelinquent and delinquent coping, among which is “conventional social support” (Agnew, 
1992).  The types of instrumental and emotional support envisioned by Agnew encompasses 
essentially the same issues that Levin and Madfis include in their model.  Conceptualizing social 
supports in this way preserves a primary distinction between strain theory and control theory – 
strain theory contends that people are pressured into crime by negative affective states, while 
control theory contends that the absence of significant relationships with others frees people to 
engage in crime (Agnew, 1992).  Since CST is premised on the overall effects of strain and not 
on the assumption that the lack of pro-social connections frees individuals to offend, it seems 
prudent to view social relationships as a possible constraint within GST.  Our findings of mixed 
evidence of “conventional social support” (or, as CST puts it, “uncontrolled strain”) suggests that 
the presence or absence of pro-social relationships was not a crucial factor in the march toward 
violence of the public mass murderers.  But, importantly for our sample, unlike social control 
theory GST also expressly accounts for negative relationships in which the individual is not 
treated as desired or expected by others thereby presenting a noxious stimulus/strain (Agnew, 
1992).  As shown in Tables 1 and 3, the sample of public mass murderers had substantial amount 
of non-trivial problems with their personal relationships, generally more than the sample of lone 
actor terrorists.   
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The third and perhaps most important way in which GST subsumes certain aspects of the 
cumulative strain theory arises indirectly from asking a question relevant to any act of 
premeditated violence – who will be the target(s)?  CST only implicitly answers this question.  
While the acute strain that immediately precedes the planning stage could be related to bullying 
or unjust treatment by school administrators (or, in our study, a poor job performance review, 
problems in a personal relationship, etc.), CST does not speak to whether the eventual victims 
will be connected to this final strain, will be connected to some other facet of the offender’s life, 
or will simply be the next person(s) who cross the offender’s path.  Unstated, but implied by 
CST, is that targets naturally arise from the circumstances that the offender experiences as an 
acute strain.  Levin and Madfis (2009) write that after the acute strain, “[n]o longer feeling able 
to cope and feeling as if there is nothing left in life to lose, the potential shooter is inspired to get 
even and show the world” (emphasis added) (1237).  The emotional reaction Levin and Madfis 
describe – the desire to get even – is evocative of what Agnew describes as the “most critical 
emotional reaction for the purposes of the general strain theory” – anger (Agnew, 1992, p. 59).  
Indeed, GST posits that the “key” emotion of anger will create a “desire for retaliation/revenge” 
(Agnew, 1992, p. 59 – 60).  We found that this sentiment – to get even – did, in fact, play a 
pivotal role in many public mass murders. 
 
Grievance 
At least regarding public mass murderers, we believe that the best way to describe this 
perceived need for retaliation is through the concept of grievance found in the behavioral 
pathway model conceptualized in two US Secret Service studies, one involving assassinations of 
public figures and the other school shootings (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999; Vossekuil at al., 2004).  
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These (and following studies) theorized a route from idea to action comprising ideation, 
planning, preparation and implementation.  The same phases were incorporated into a model of a 
“pathway to violence” (Calhoun & Weston, 2003), which proposes six milestones on the 
trajectory: grievance, ideation, research and planning, preparation, breach and attack. 
In the threat assessment literature in which the pathway to violence model arose, a 
grievance is generally defined as the cause of the offender’s distress or resentment, a perception 
of having been wronged or treated unfairly or inappropriately.  A grievance is a subjective 
experience that need not have an objective foundation; it can arise from actual slights and 
defeats, imagined wrongs, mental illness or some combination of these possibilities.  More than a 
feeling of anger, a grievance often results in a desire, even a sense of mission, to right the wrong 
and achieve a measure of deserved justice (Calhoun & Weston, 2003; Fein & Vossekuil, 1999; 
Vossekuil et al., 2004).  Characteristic of a grievance is that the offender attributes his or her own 
distress to an external source, something beyond the offender that has acted or is acting unfairly 
against the offender.  This externalization of responsibility echoes the interplay between anger 
and blame found in both GST (Agnew, 1992) and CST. 
Primarily taking as evidence the offender’s own words and/or writings, we found that 
63.5% of offenders had an identifiable grievance.  In 89% of those cases the grievance was 
against a specific person or entity (e.g., supervisor, governmental agency), in 24.7% of those 
cases the grievance was against a category of people (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender), and in 11% of 
those cases the grievance was against an idea, philosophy or movement (e.g., religion) (14 
offenders had two types of grievance, and 4 offenders had three types of grievance).  The 
prevalence of grievance we found is like that found in prior research.  In their study of school 
shooters, Vossekuil et al. (2004) found that 75% of the attackers had a grievance against at least 
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one of their targets, and in their study of assassinations and near-attacks of public officials, Fein 
and Vossekuil (1999) found that 67% of their sample had a grievance, with 57% having a 
grievance against a target of attack.   
The concept of grievance is complementary to strain analysis.  The hypothesized 
diminishing of an offender’s coping resources through chronic and acute strain can reasonably be 
seen as priming the crystallization of a grievance.  And many of these chronic and acute strains 
(e.g., work stressors, financial difficulties, experiences of being degraded, treated unfairly) are of 
the kind that would likely allow the offender to identify a specific external source responsible for 
the offender’s suffering. 
Recognition of a grievance can provide needed context to the occurrence of an acute 
strain that acts as a “tipping point,” in many cases taking the acute strain out of the realm of 
random occurrence in a string of unrelated failures and linking it to specific and identifiable 
belief or feeling held by the offender.  In more than half the cases where there was an identifiable 
grievance (56.2%), a specific incident or experience related to the grievance appears to have 
played a role in the public mass murderer moving toward the attack (in 11 of the cases, the 
specific incident appears to have given rise to the grievance).   
Grievance can also help make sense of the apparent lack of planning behaviors in the 
non-spontaneous public mass murders.  That offenders spent little time or effort in operational 
planning, particularly in comparison to the lone actor terrorists, can be attributed at least in part 
to the fact that in many cases they already knew what they wanted to do – attack the person or 
entity that they perceived to be the cause of their suffering.  Of course, facets unique to a terrorist 
attack (e.g., the need for a target related to ideology, the desire to maximize symbolic effect) 
might dictate operational decisions that could require additional planning efforts as compared to 
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public mass murderers, but the relative lack of preparatory behaviors suggests that, for many 
public mass murderers, formation of a grievance is the essential planning.  
Similarly, grievance helps explain our findings concerning the event.  For example, 62 
offenders with a grievance also had a discriminate target, and 60 of those offenders (96.8%) 
attacked a discriminate target related to their grievance.  Charles Thornton thought that for many 
years the city government unfairly targeted him and his business ventures, and in 2008 he 
stormed a city council meeting, shooting and killing five, including council members.  Grievance 
also appears to inform where the attack takes place; 65 offenders with a grievance attacked at a 
location with which they had a history, and for 48 of those offenders (73.8%) their grievance was 
connected to the attack location with which they had a history.  In 1994, Dean Allen Mellberg, 
whose dream was to be in the military, returned to the Air Force base from which he had been 
discharged and killed (among others) the psychiatrist and psychologist who had recommended 
that discharge.  Additionally, the presence of a grievance might help explain the fact that nearly 
half of all offenders died by suicide or at the hands of law enforcement at the event.  Fueled by a 
sense of mission borne from a perception of having been treated unjustly, the offender may have 
reached the overarching objective in his or her life and no longer have a reason to live – a 
decision perhaps more easily reached by an offender who has faced both chronic and acute 
strains. 
 Finally, and importantly, the concept of grievance might play a key role in distinguishing 
those who suffer strains and commit violence such as public mass murder from those who suffer 
strains but do not act violently (at least not on a scale of causing mass casualties).  Given the vast 
range of experiences potentially encompassed by GST it is likely that wide swaths of the general 
population regularly encounter strain in their lives.  In the original formulation of GST Agnew 
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recognized that individuals may react to strain in several ways, only some of which involve 
crime, and that many may cope by using a variety of cognitive strategies to minimize their 
suffering (Agnew, 1992).  Specifically, though, he noted that those who blame their strain on 
others are more likely to commit crimes (Agnew, 1992).  And, when he subsequently expanded 
on his theory, Agnew proposed that strains are most likely to result in crime when, among other 
things, they are seen as unjust and perceived as high in magnitude (Agnew, 2001).  Assigning 
culpability to another for perceived undeserved distress is the very basis of a grievance, the 
presence of which may be useful for homing in on those facing a series of life difficulties who 




 Beyond its explanatory efficacy for school shootings, when CST is seen as an elaboration 
of general strain theory it proves to be a valuable approach for examining the trajectory of 
offenders toward public mass murder, especially when the implicit concept of grievance is made 
explicit.  The holistic approach of assessing cumulative strains, in which both distal and proximal 
experiences and behaviors are considered, is an important step in moving the discussion of 
multiple murderers generally, and public mass murderers specifically, away from purely 
descriptive typologies.  This is not the end, of course; there is much work to be done, including 
evaluating more precisely how the stages intersect at the individual level, determining whether 
there are “critical” levels of strain and/or strains in certain circumstances that actuate the move 
toward violence, and assessing whether the model is relevant to related offender types, such as 
domestic/family mass murderers and assassins of public figures.  Our findings also recommend 
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studies focused on grievance formation.  Ideally, these studies would address false positives, 
comparing offenders who have a grievance to a group of individuals who have a grievance but 
do not act violently, perhaps pointing to specific characteristics of those facing multiple life 
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Variable     Public Mass  Lone Actor 
Murderer (%)  Terrorist (%) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Male       97   99 
Born Outside U.S.     19   23 
Highest/HS**      31   14 
College Grad*      10   24 
Arrested      56   59 
Convicted      43   58 
Incarcerated      27   34 
Mental Illness      47   39 
Substance Abuse*     44   27 
Service Industry     30   18 
    Professional          5        9 
Unemployed > 6mosprior    13   24 
                Work stress > 6mosprior*        20        7 
                Financial Problems > 6mosprior                  15       14 
                Problems – Personal > 6mosprior***      36       11 
                Not Care > 6mosprior        11        9 
                Degraded > 6mosprior*        23        9 
                Unjust treatment > 6mosprior       25       16 
                Disrespected > 6mosprior                   19       16 
Angry > 6mosprior                31             24 
                Long-Term Stress***        63                                27 
_________________________________________________________________ 
















Variable     Public Mass   Lone Actor 
  Murderer (%)    Terrorist (%) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Socially Isolated**    26   51 
Lived Alone**    24   44 
Single/Never Married    34   38 
                      Partnered             16   6 
Married     13   20 
Divorced     10   17 
__________________________________________________________________ 




Table 3 – Prevalence of Acute Strain 
____________________________________________ 
Variable     Public Mass  Lone Actor 
 Murderer (%)   Terrorist (%) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Work Stressor < 6mosprior***  29   4 
 Unemployed < 6mosprior    24   13 
 Financial Problems < 6mosprior   19   13 
Problems-Personal < 6mosprior**  25   7 
Degraded < 6mosprior*   17   6 
Unjust treatment < 6mosprior   10   6 
Disrespected < 6mosprior   11   6 
Not Care < 6mosprior*   16   4 
 Changed Address < 6mosprior***   13    35 
Angry < 6mosprior     36   24 
Recent Elevated Stress < 6mosprior**  37   17 
__________________________________________________________________ 











Variable     Public Mass  Lone Actor 
 Murderer (%)  Terrorist (%) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Recruit Others***    15   85 
Joined Wider Movement***    6   32 
Help Procuring Weapons**    7   21 
Read Propaganda by Offenders**   3   16 
Read Literature About Offenders***   6   26 
Read Literature from Wider Movement***  4   60 
F2F Meeting***     7   44 
Virtual Interaction***     3   24 
Dry Runs***      4   34 
Training**      8   24 
Travel***      2   27 
                      Changed Appearance              8   6 
Planned Getaway    15   20 
Planned Further Attacks***   14   55 
Drugs/Alcohol Prior**               20      4 
__________________________________________________________________ 
p*<.05    p**<.01    p***<.001 
 
Table 5 –  Prevalence of Event Stage Behaviors 
____________________________________________ 
Variable     Public Mass       Lone Actor 
 Murderer (%)  Terrorist (%) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
History with Location***    79   30 
Targeted People***     91   48 
Targeted Property***     0   13 
Targeted Both***     9   32 
Discriminate Target     79   70 
Multiple Sites      28   16 
Firearm***      93   45 
Explosive Device***     2   48 
Offender Died at Scene***    56   11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
  p*<.05    p **<.01    p ***<.001  
